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INTRODUCTION
Do federal courts have the constitutional authority to definitively
determine questions of politics? The answer would appear obvious:
No. Separation-of-powers principles mandate that the judiciary
play no direct role in the political process. Instead, federal courts
are limited to faithfully applying the outcome of the political process (i.e., law) to particular sets of facts.1 Peculiar then is the major
questions doctrine, which calls on courts to determine policy questions’ “economic and political significance.”2
The major questions doctrine is said to do one thing but in practice does another. What is more, at least two sitting Supreme Court
Justices have proposed strengthening the major questions doctrine
so that it does something else entirely.3 Both of those Justices are
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (describing the “judicial Power” as extending to “Cases”
and “Controversies”); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115–16 (1962) (“One of the chief faculties of the
judiciary, which is lacking in the legislature and which fits the courts for the function
of evolving and applying constitutional principles, is that the judgment of courts can
come later, after the hopes and prophecies expressed in legislation have been tested in
the actual workings of our society; the judgment of courts may be had in concrete cases
that exemplify the actual consequences of legislative or executive actions.”); John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 438 (2005) [hereinafter
Textualism and Legislative Intent] (“Textualists focus on the end product of the legislative
process . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 276 (2005) (referring to judicial restraint as “reinforc[ing] the basic theory on which our political system is grounded”).
2. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (referring to “a question of deep ‘economic
and political significance’” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014) (UARG))); see UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160)); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (“[W]e must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and
political magnitude to an administrative agency.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel.
& Telegram Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would
leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially,
rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that
through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”).
3. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the
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committed textualists.4 The present moment thus calls for a thorough explanation as to why textualists should reject the major questions doctrine—including what the doctrine is said to be, what the
doctrine actually does in practice, and what the doctrine might
soon become.
The major questions doctrine is said to assist courts in identifying
whether Congress has delegated authority. As the Supreme Court
put it, “We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to
an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”5
Baked into that understanding of the major questions doctrine is an
implicit presumption that has gone unexamined in present scholarship—namely, that it is Congress who decides what is major. How
else could Congress fairly be “expect[ed]” to more clearly delegate
major authority than non-major authority if Congress does not itself determine what is major?
If the major questions doctrine truly implies a need for courts to
elucidate and respect congressional determinations of majorness,
textualists should reject the doctrine. That is because textualists understand the 535-member Congress as having no single conception
as to what is politically major. Different legislators (and the President exercising the veto power) have different understandings as
to which policy questions are major. Thus, from the textualist’s perspective, tasking courts with elucidating a single majorness determination shared by all of Congress is to task courts with conducting
an ordinarily futile task.
Even if elucidating a congressional determination of majorness
were in some instances theoretically possible, textualists should be
suspect of the current doctrine’s reliance on the judge-made
denial of certiorari). The proposal to strengthen the major questions doctrine is discussed in Part I.C.
4. See, e.g., Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy
of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 908–09 (2016) (“Respectfully, it seems to
me an assiduous focus on text, structure, and history is essential to the proper exercise
of the judicial function.”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016) (“If the text is sufficiently clear, the text usually controls”).
5. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).
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“presumption” that Congress “intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.”6 That judgemade presumption is in tension with the enacted text of the Congressional Review Act (CRA).7 That Act presumes that federal
agencies will answer major questions through major rules, and that
those rules are to be given legal effect unless Congress expressly
says otherwise.8
Textualism is also incompatible with what the major questions
doctrine does in practice. As an analysis of the relevant major questions doctrine cases will reveal, courts are entirely unconcerned
with elucidating congressional determinations of majorness.
Courts are instead interested in determining majorness themselves.
So although the major questions doctrine is said to speak to whether
Congress has delegated authority, in practice, the major questions
doctrine is invoked to tell Congress how it may delegate authority.
The difference between those two perceptions of the current major questions doctrine is subtle because the end result is the same:
Congress makes its major delegations explicit. But there is a nontrivial distinction between a judicial attempt to elucidate and respect a congressional determination of majorness (a task textualists
should reject as ordinarily futile and statutorily suspect), and a judicial mandate to use particularly clear legislative language when
discussing those policy questions that a court declares to be major.
The latter amounts to courts improperly inserting themselves into
the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. Because Article I, Section
7 establishes the exclusive lawmaking procedures within which
courts are to play no role, textualists should reject the major questions doctrine for what it allows in practice.9
Textualists should also reject what the major questions doctrine
might soon become. In its current form, the major questions
6. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (describing a presumption upon which
the major questions doctrine is grounded).
7. See 5 U.S.C §§ 801–808 (2018).
8. See infra Part II.B.3.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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doctrine is already a product of the Supreme Court’s historical reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, which itself prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers.10 But although
the current major questions doctrine might be motivated by underenforced nondelegation principles, the current major questions
doctrine stops short of prohibiting Congress from delegating any
authority. Instead, as long as Congress clearly delegates the authority to decide major questions, the current major questions doctrine
is satisfied. In two recent opinions, however, Justice Gorsuch (writing for three)11 and Justice Kavanaugh (writing alone)12 have proposed strengthening the major questions doctrine so that it could
be used to prohibit Congress from delegating major authority. To
wit, a strengthened major questions doctrine would prohibit Congress from delegating the “authority to decide major policy questions,” while leaving Congress free to delegate “the authority to decide less-major or fill-up-the-details decisions.”13
For those eager to breathe new life into the nondelegation doctrine, strengthening the major questions doctrine may seem like a
step in the right direction. After all, preventing “major” delegations
may seem better than not preventing any delegations. On the other
side of the same coin, those who fear that a fully reinvigorated
10. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV.
777, 781 & n.9 (2017) (“[T]he M[ajor questions exception] indirectly polices the limits of
the nondelegation doctrine.”); Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in
Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (2010) (“Taking the elephants-in-mouseholes
doctrine seriously as a doctrine, this Article proposes that the decisions
are . . . driven . . . by long-standing tenets of administrative law, particularly concerns
over excessive delegation to the Executive Branch. We argue, then, that what really lies
in the mousehole is neither an elephant nor a mouse—but the ghost of the nondelegation doctrine.”); Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 825 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the major questions doctrine was “born of nondelegation concerns”).
11. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas. Id. at 2131. Justice Alito additionally signaled his willingness to “revisit” the
nondelegation doctrine in a different case. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
12. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).
13. Id. (interpreting Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent).
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nondelegation doctrine would spell disaster for the modern administrative state may see an extended major questions doctrine as a
more palatable half-measure. But despite the doctrine’s potential to
serve as a modus vivendi, textualists should reject a strengthened
major questions doctrine. This means that, for textualist jurists interested in reviving the nondelegation doctrine, strengthening the
major questions doctrine is the wrong way forward. Failing to
acknowledge as much risks tying a revived nondelegation doctrine
to a majorness inquiry that, at bottom, asks courts to exercise the
same type of political discretion that has doomed the current nondelegation doctrine to decades of underutilization.14
After providing a brief overview of the relevant doctrines in Part
I, Part II explains why textualists should reject the major questions
doctrine—both in its present and strengthened forms. Explaining
as much requires answering a threshold question that courts and
scholars have yet to address: Who determines majorness? As noted
above, there are two possible answers, either Congress or the
courts. Neither answer is acceptable from the textualist’s perspective.
After explaining why textualists should reject the major questions
doctrine, Part III highlights two pre-decisional contexts in which
courts may consider policy questions’ “importance” in an effort to
advance nondelegation principles. First, in considering petitions
for writs of certiorari, the Supreme Court may consider whether a
case presents an “important” federal question.15 Second, federal
courts of appeals may consider a case’s “importance” when considering whether the case warrants en banc review.16 From the textualist’s perspective, these two “importance” inquiries are less objectionable than the major questions doctrine because Congress has
granted federal courts the statutory authority to consider “importance” in pre-decisional contexts, but not “majorness” when deciding cases on the merits.17 Thus, those textualist jurists who wish
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. SUP. CT. R. 10(c).
16. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
17. Infra Part III.
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to limit a revived nondelegation doctrine to major questions may
prefer to do so in part by applying the revived doctrine to those
cases identified as presenting important nondelegation questions.
I.

DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW

The nondelegation doctrine considers what authority Congress
can delegate. Currently, the major questions doctrine is said to
speak to whether Congress has delegated authority—although in
practice the doctrine is used to tell Congress how it can delegate authority. Part I provides a brief overview of the current state of both
the nondelegation and major questions doctrines, as well as the recent proposal to strengthen the latter doctrine into a revived form
of the first.
A.

The Nondelegation Doctrine

Derived from the Constitution’s vesting of “all legislative Powers” in Congress, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress
from delegating its legislative powers to other entities, such as administrative agencies.18 Today the doctrine permits Congress to delegate decision-making discretion to agencies so long as the
agency’s discretion is cabined by an “intelligible principle” set by
Congress.19 The “intelligible principle” test is not difficult to satisfy,
making the modern nondelegation doctrine something of a dead
letter. As Professor Cass Sunstein put it, the nondelegation doctrine
“has had one good year,” and over two hundred “bad ones.”20
In the good year, 1935, the Supreme Court considered a provision
in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that purported to
prohibit the transportation of oil produced in excess of quotas set

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also BICKEL, supra note 1, at 223 (“In the . . . delegation
cases . . . the Court finds that the legislature, if it did anything, did too much all at once;
and that is deemed too little.”).
19. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 393, 414 (2015) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)).
20. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
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by “order of the President.”21 Pursuant to that authority, the President approved a “Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.”22 Oil industry plaintiffs sued to prevent the enforcement of
the code, arguing that the Recovery Act constituted “an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power.”23
In considering the challenge, the Court observed that Congress
had not “establishe[d]” any “criterion to govern the President’s
course,” nor had Congress “declare[d]” any “policy as to the transportation of the excess production.”24 Instead, Congress had provided “the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy” himself, thereby “commit[ting] to the President the functions
of a legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative
officer.”25 The NIRA’s purported delegation of authority was therefore unconstitutional.26
A few months later the Court considered another NIRA provision, pursuant to which the President had approved a “Live Poultry Code.”27 The defendants in that case were indicted for reasons
relating to a variety of the code’s provisions, including the selling
of “an unfit chicken.”28 In considering whether Congress could delegate the authority to promulgate the code, the Court again
“look[ed] to the statute to see” if Congress had “itself established
the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others.”29 Because the NIRA offered few guiding principles to limit the President’s discretion, the
Court invalidated the code as resulting from an unconstitutional
21. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 406 (1935) (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933)).
22. Id. at 408–09.
23. Id. at 411.
24. Id. at 415.
25. Id. at 415, 418–19.
26. See id. at 433.
27. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521, 523 (1935)
(citing National Industrial Recovery Act. § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196–97 (1933)).
28. Id. at 528.
29. Id. at 530.
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“delegation of legislative power.”30
The canonical story of the nondelegation is said to end there, after
which the Supreme Court is said to have turned its back on the doctrine and paved the way for the rise of the modern administrative
state.31 The Court’s historical reluctance to invoke the nondelegation doctrine is often attributed to the difficulty in developing a judicially manageable standard,32 something that at least one notable
textualist has written about in detail. As Justice Scalia explained,
“while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an
element readily enforceable by the courts.”33 That conclusion
aligned with his earlier writings, where he had noted that, without
a “workable test” for courts to apply, the nondelegation doctrine
“is no doctrine at all, but merely an invitation to judicial policy
making in the guise of constitutional law.”34 Any effort to “successful[ly] reform . . . the nondelegation doctrine”35 therefore requires
addressing the concern that “the line drawing” required by the
nondelegation doctrine “is not a legal analysis at all, but is instead
political (because it is discretionary) at its core.”36

30. Id. at 537, 551.
31. See Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380–81 & n.6 (2017) (describing the familiar “narrative”).
32. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 781, 821 n.170 (2009) (“The Article I nondelegation doctrine serves largely as
a ‘theoretical’ prohibition because, as many commentators have observed, courts have
not found a judicially manageable standard for enforcing it.” (citation omitted)).
33. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 354 (2002) (“[Justice
Scalia] made clear [in Mistretta] that he regards the degree of discretion to be vested in
administrators as essentially a political question that cannot (at least in the normal run
of cases) be evaluated by courts.”).
34. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REG. 25, 28 (1980).
35. Adam White, Nondelegation’s Gerrymander Problem, YALE J. REG. (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/nondelegations-gerrymander-problem [https://perma.cc
/78MH-QLPH].
36. William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2118 (2017); Lawson, supra note 33, at 354.
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Despite the nondelegation doctrine’s “somewhat moribund”37
state, at least five sitting Supreme Court Justices have expressed interest in developing a workable doctrine. In Gundy v. United States,38
Justice Gorsuch suggested in a dissenting opinion—joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas—that the “intelligible principle” test was constitutionally suspect.39 The three Justices expressed
a desire to “revisit” how much legislative authority Congress can
“hand[] off” to the executive branch.40 In a brief concurrence, Justice
Alito noted that he too would “support th[e] effort” to “reconsider[]” the intelligible principle doctrine in a different case.41 Several months later, a newly seated Justice Kavanaugh had the opportunity to explain that his colleagues’ desire to revisit the nondelegation doctrine “raised important points that may warrant further
consideration in future cases.”42 One of those “important points”
was the major questions doctrine.43
B.

The Major Questions Doctrine

The major questions doctrine is said to be a statutory canon assisting courts in determining whether Congress has delegated to
agencies the authority to decide major questions.44 As Part II.C.1
will explain, that understanding of the major questions doctrine
does not precisely track how the major questions doctrine works in
practice. But for purposes of the brief doctrinal overview offered
here, the major questions doctrine is accepted at face value.
37. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014) (No. 13–354), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2013/13-354_3ebh.pdf [http:// perma.cc/J7XT-J43D].
38. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
39. Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“This mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or
even in the decision from which it was plucked.”).
40. Id. at 2131.
41. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
42. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
43. Id.
44. See Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH.
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 480 (2016).
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The major questions doctrine defines major questions as those
having major “economic and political significance.”45 The specifics
of the major questions doctrine are underdeveloped and frequently
evolving. Depending on one’s count, the doctrine has been deployed in at least three stages of analysis, all of which concern Chevron46 deference.47
Where Chevron applies, a court must not “impose its own construction” of a statute if the “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to” the legal issue at hand.48 Instead, the court is limited to
determining “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”49 The Chevron test is often described
as having three steps: at Step Zero, courts consider whether Chevron’s analysis should apply at all;50 at Step One, courts consider
whether a statute is “ambiguous”; at Step Two, courts consider
whether the agency’s interpretation of that ambiguous statute is
“reasonable.”51
The Supreme Court first invoked the major questions doctrine in
MCI Telecommunications. Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.52 At issue in MCI was the Communications Act of 1934, which
provided the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with authority to “modify” certain rate-filing requirements.53 Purporting to
45. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); see also King
v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (referring to “a question of deep ‘economic and
political significance’” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014) (UARG))); UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (referring to “decisions of vast economic and
political significance”).
46. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
47. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major Questions
Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 149 (2017); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 10, at
26.
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
49. Id.
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006) [hereinafter Chevron Step Zero]; Barnett & Walker, supra note 47, at 150.
51. Chevron Step Zero, supra note 50, at 190 (describing the two-step inquiry as “famously” understood).
52. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
53. Id. at 224 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988 ed.
and Supp. IV)).
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exercise its power to modify those requirements, the FCC had issued
a rule exempting certain telephone companies from having to comply with the rate-filling requirements.54 But because the rate-filling
requirements were of “enormous importance” to the overall “statutory scheme,”55 the Court concluded that the FCC had overstepped its congressionally delegated authority.56 It would have
been “highly unlikely,” the Court explained, for “Congress [to]
leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or
even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion.”57
The Court next invoked the major questions doctrine in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.58 In Brown & Williamson, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) sought to regulate tobacco under
statutory references to “drugs” and “devices.”59 According to the
Court, however, regulating tobacco was a matter of major “economic and political significance.”60 Thus, “[a]s in MCI,” the Court
was “confident” that Congress had not “intended to delegate” such
a “signfican[t]” decision “to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”61
This was particularly true in light of several statutes that Congress
had enacted after granting the FDA the authority to regulate drugs
and devices.62 Those later-enacted statutes created a complex statutory scheme suggesting that Congress had not intended to grant the
FDA the authority to regulate tobacco.63 If Congress wished to delegate the authority to regulate something as major as tobacco, the
then-burgeoning major questions doctrine expected Congress to
have made that delegation explicit.
A third example of the major questions doctrine was displayed in

54. See id. at 220–22.
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id. at 231–32.
57. Id. at 231.
58. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
59. Id. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)–(h), 393 (1994 ed. and Supp. III)).
60. Id. at 160.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 144.
63. See id.
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Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG).64 Unlike both MCI and
Brown & Williamson, where the Court invoked the major questions
doctrine at Chevron Step One,65 the UARG Court invoked the doctrine at Chevron Step Two.66 After rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) assertion that the relevant statute was unambiguous,67 the Court explained that the EPA’s proposed interpretation was “unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization.”68 “When an agency
claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to
regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’” the
Court explained, “we typically greet its announcement with a
measure of skepticism.”69 Indeed, the Court “expect[s] Congress to
speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
‘economic and political significance.’”70
The major questions doctrine has also been invoked at Chevron
Step Zero. There the major questions doctrine acts as a sort of exception to Chevron.71 In King v. Burwell72 the Court considered
whether the Affordable Care Act authorized tax benefits for insurance purchased on federal exchanges.73 Despite language in the
statute suggesting that the tax benefits applied only to insurance
purchased on state exchanges, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
interpreted the statute to apply the tax benefits to insurance purchased on federal exchanges and state exchanges alike.74 The King
Court explained that it was tasked with deciding an “‘extraordinary case[],‘” since “[t]he tax credits are among the [Affordable
64. 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
65. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 47, at 150 n.11.
66. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 10, at 790.
67. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 312.
68. Id. at 324.
69. Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
70. Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).
71. See Chevron Step Zero, supra note 50, at 189 (referring to Chevron as “a kind of
counter-Marbury for the administrative state”).
72. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
73. See id. at 2485.
74. See id. at 2487.
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Care] Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending
each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of
people.”75 Determining “[w]hether those credits are available on
Federal Exchanges” required answering “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance.’”76 “[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to an agency,” the Court explained, Congress
“surely would have done so expressly.”77
Having determined the question to be major, the King Court concluded that it could not defer to the IRS’s statutory interpretation.78
Instead, the Court went on to independently “determine the correct
reading” of the statutory provision.79 The correct reading, according to the Court, was that the tax benefits were applicable to state
and federal exchanges.80
Lower courts have engaged with the major questions doctrine as
well.81 Perhaps most notable is United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
where then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented from the D.C. Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc.82 Referring to the “major rule” doctrine,
then-Judge Kavanaugh understood the doctrine as requiring courts
to look for “clear congressional authorization for an agency’s major
rule.”83 That requirement was grounded in two presumptions: first,
75. Id. at 2488–89 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
76. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. See id. at 2489.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 2489, 2496. Justice Scalia dissented on textualist grounds, taking issue
with the majority’s “absurd” holding “that when the . . . Affordable Care Act says ‘Exchange established by the State’ it means ‘Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government.’” Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be sure, the majority resisted
the argument that its holding was inconsistent with the statutory text. According to the
majority, the statute could “fairly be read” to apply to both state and federal exchanges.
Id. (majority opinion). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, remained unconvinced. See, e.g., id. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court ‘does not revise legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 794 (2014))).
81. See, e.g., Coenen & Davis, supra note 10, at 796–99 (2017) (listing lower court cases).
82. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
83. Id. at 435.
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“a separation-of-powers-based presumption against the delegation
of major lawmaking authority from Congress to the Executive
Branch,” and second, “a presumption that Congress intends to
make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to
agencies.”84
Applying the major questions doctrine to the FCC’s net neutrality
rule then at issue, then-Judge Kavanaugh outlined two questions:
“(1) Is the net neutrality rule a major rule? (2) If so, has Congress
clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net neutrality rule?”85 As to
the first question, then-Judge Kavanaugh acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had “not articulated a bright-line test that distinguishes major rules from ordinary rules,” but explained that “the
Court’s cases indicate that a number of factors are relevant.”86
Those factors included “the amount of money involved for regulated and affected parties, the overall impact on the economy, the
number of people affected, and the degree of congressional and
public attention to the issue.”87 Acknowledging that the majorness
inquiry had “a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality,” thenJudge Kavanaugh concluded that the net neutrality rule qualified
as major “under any conceivable test.”88 Because the net neutrality
rule was a major rule that “Congress ha[d] not clearly authorized
the FCC to issue,” then-Judge Kavanaugh would have held the rule
unlawful.89
C.

Strengthening the Major Questions Doctrine

Although the major questions doctrine may be motivated by a
desire to scratch the nondelegation itch, the doctrine does not currently prohibit Congress from delegating major authority so long
as Congress does so explicitly. Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh,
however, seem prepared to take things a step further.
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 422.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 422–23.
88. Id. at 423.
89. Id. at 418.
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Acknowledging in Gundy v. United States90 that the nondelegation
doctrine has been underenforced, Justice Gorsuch explained that
“[w]hen one legal doctrine becomes unavailable to do its intended
work, the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional system sometimes shift the responsibility to different doctrines.”91 Given that
hydraulic pressure, the Court “still regularly rein[s] in Congress’s
efforts to delegate legislative power” with the help of alternative
tools.92 One alternative tool is the major questions doctrine, which
Justice Gorsuch described as having been deployed “in service of
the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power.”93
Justice Gorsuch referred to the major questions doctrine as “nominally” being a statutory canon.94 This description is perhaps a hint
that the current doctrine is better understood as empowering courts
to tell Congress how it may delegate major authority, rather than a
passive statutory canon informing courts as to whether Congress has
delegated such authority. Regardless of what Justice Gorsuch
meant to suggest, his Gundy dissent could be read as stopping short
of proposing that the major questions doctrine be strengthened to
prohibit Congress from delegating the authority to decide major
questions. Justice Kavanaugh, however, did not read Justice Gorsuch’s dissent as being so limited. He instead read Justice Gorsuch’s
conception of the major questions doctrine as “not allow[ing] . . . congressional delegations to agencies of authority to
decide major policy questions . . . even if Congress expressly and
specifically delegates that authority.”95
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh’s opinions should not be
treated as idiosyncratic statements. Jurists have long alluded to a
distinction between “major” and “non-major” questions—even if

90. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
91. Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2142 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
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not in those precise terms, and even if the line between those two
categories has not been clearly demarcated. Chief Justice Marshall,
for example, once distinguished “those important subjects, which
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill
up the details.”96 For his part, Justice Kavanaugh paid particular attention to the views expressed “by then-Justice Rehnquist some 40
years ago” in the Benzene case.97 In the Benzene case, then-Justice
Rehnquist understood Congress to have “improperly delegated” to
the Secretary of Labor “one of the most difficult issues that could
confront a decisionmaker: whether the statistical possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic
costs of preventing those deaths.”98 Such “important choices of social policy” had to be “made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.”99 It followed, according to then-Justice Rehnquist, that Congress could not delegate the
authority to decide such major questions.100 Further historical support comes from Justice Thomas, who expressed his view that “the
significance of [a] delegated decision” may in some instances be “too
great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”101
To date, courts have not substantially expanded on these historical references. It therefore remains unclear how an important or significant question is identified, and whether those inquiries call for
the same exercise of political considerations necessitated by the
96. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825) (emphasis added).
97. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari)
(citing Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–686
(1980) (Benzene) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)). Jacob Loshin and Aaron
Nielson similarly traced the major questions doctrine to “an attempt to ‘doctrinalize’
the Benzene approach into a workable test.” Loshin & Nielson, supra note 10, at 22.
98. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 685–86.
100. See id. at 672.
101. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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major questions doctrine. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh’s
recent efforts to build upon these historical references therefore require serious thought, which this Article will now attempt to provide.
II.

THE TEXTUALIST CRITIQUE

The major questions doctrine is underdeveloped in both scholarship and case law. Indeed, one important threshold question has
yet to be answered: Who determines majorness? One answer to this
question—the answer implied by current doctrine—is that majorness is determined by Congress. If that answer were correct, a
court’s task would be to elucidate congressional determinations of
majorness. Textualists should reject that task as being ordinarily futile and based on a statutorily suspect presumption.
A second answer to the threshold question is that majorness is
determined by the judiciary, and a court’s task is to exercise its own
political discretion to determine which policy questions are major.
A review of the relevant precedent reveals that, as a descriptive
matter, this answer best explains how the current major questions
doctrine works in practice. This answer also underlies the strengthened form of the major questions doctrine proposed by Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. Under that strengthened form of the doctrine, Congress would not only be prohibited from implicitly delegating authority thought by the courts to be major, but would be
entirely prohibited from delegating such authority—even if Congress disagrees as to the court’s political determination. Textualists
should reject this understanding of the major questions doctrine because it improperly inserts courts into the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process.102
102. Theoretically there is a third answer to the threshold question: the executive
branch could determine majorness. This Article does not thoroughly examine that possibility because, if majorness were definitively determined by the executive branch,
there would be little need for a major questions doctrine to begin with. Consider those
situations where the executive branch (through either the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, see infra Part II.B.3, or the agency issuing the challenged rule)
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Textualism Defined

By “textualist,” this Article refers to those who understand courts
to be faithful agents of “the people,” as that term is used in the Constitution.103 The people can express their will—within constitutional
limits—in statutes enacted through the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. To interpret the people’s will as expressed in such

determined a rule to be major, and a litigant brought suit to challenge that majorness
determination. In those situations, courts would either quickly rule in favor of the
plaintiff (where the court concludes that Congress did not, or could not, delegate major
authority), or quickly rule in favor of the agency (where the court concludes that Congress did, and could, delegate major authority). In those other situations where the executive branch determined the rule to be non-major, courts would simply dismiss the
case in the agency’s favor. And to the extent that courts would merely consider the
executive branch’s majorness determination to be persuasive (but not dipositive) evidence, the majorness inquiry is better understood as calling on courts to determine majorness for themselves. See generally infra Part II.C (examining judicial considerations of
majorness).
103. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people of the United States . . .”). Many textualists
refer to themselves as faithful agents of Congress, referencing that legislative body as a
shorthand for the people who vested it with authority. See Amy C. Barrett, Congressional
Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2208–11 (2017) (referring to competing
textualist theories of faithful agency). Other textualists, such as Justice Scalia, have
more clearly stated that “courts are assuredly not agents of the legislature” but instead
“are agents of the people.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 138 (2012). Following Justice Scalia’s lead, this Article
opts to more clearly refer to textualists as being faithful agents of the people. Although
the difference in terminology may be little more than semantic for the purposes of this
Article, there are two reasons for more clearly referring to the people. First, the judiciary
and the Congress are coequal branches; neither is an agent or principal of the other.
Second, referring to Congress alone gives short shrift to the President, whom the people
have also empowered to participate in the federal lawmaking process by exercising the
veto power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and by “recommend[ing] to [Congress] . . . such
measures as [the President] shall judge necessary and expedient.” U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3. Justice Story understood the latter as enabling the President “to point out the evil,
and . . . suggest the remedy.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1555, at 413 (1833); see also Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The
First Word: The President’s Place in “Legislative History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 404–05
(1990) (“James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention reveal that the
Framers specifically designed the recommendation clause to place an affirmative obligation on the President. . . . Presidents have faithfully presented messages since President Washington’s first term.”).
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statutes, textualists look to the statutes’ objectified intent.104 Objectified intent means the intent that an objective reader would take a
text to have at the time the text was enacted.105 The inquiry is limited to objectified intent because textualists understand the legislative process to be complicated and chock-full of political bargains
that cannot (and need not) be fully understood by individual legislators, let alone politically insulated jurists.106 What matters is that
the collective legislature voted for a law with a particular text, and
that text had a particular public meaning when it was enacted.
Textualists do not suggest that objectified intent is always
104. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 103, at 20 (“[T]he textualist routinely takes
purpose into account, but in its concrete manifestations as deduced from close reading
of the text.”); see also Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 1, at 430 (Textualists
“believe that in our system of government, federal judges have a duty to ascertain and
implement as accurately as possible the instructions set down by Congress (within constitutional bounds).”); Cory R. Liu, Textualism and the Presumption of Reasonable Drafting,
38 HARV J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 726 (“Textualists therefore refuse to go beyond the legislature’s textually-recorded intent, a concept Justice Scalia has called ‘objectified intent.’”).
105. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“We look for a
sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the
text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59,
61 (1988). (“Meaning comes from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user
of words at the time, thinking about the same problem”); Barrett, supra note 103, at
2201–02 (explaining objectified intent as described by Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook).
106. See Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 1, at 430–31 (“[T]extualists . . . think it impossible to tell how the [legislative] body as a whole actually intended
(or, more accurately, would have intended) to resolve a policy question not clearly or
satisfactorily settled by the text. . . . [L]egislative policies are reduced to law only
through a cumbersome and highly intricate lawmaking process.”); Amy C. Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2010) [hereinafter Substantive Canons] (“The defining tenet of textualism is the belief that it is impossible to know
whether Congress would have drafted the statute differently if it had anticipated the
situation before the court. The legislative process is path-dependent and riddled with
compromise.”); Amy C. Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 71 (2017) (book review) [hereinafter Countering] (“Modern textualists in particular have emphasized the ways in which the battle between competing interests
shapes legislation.”).

No. 2]

Who Determines Majorness?

483

obvious on the face of a law.107 To the contrary, an objective reader
utilizes familiar judicial tools to decipher objectified intent—legal
precedent and treatises, for example, can provide the necessary
context to understand a law’s meaning.108 Even after resorting to
such tools, textualists can sometimes disagree as to what a statute’s
objectified intent holds. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh’s
dueling textualist opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County109 provide
one notable example. Both Justices offered textualist interpretations
of statutory language prohibiting an employer from discriminating
“because of . . . sex.”110 Justice Gorsuch concluded that the statutory
language prohibited discrimination based on homosexual or
transgender status,111 while Justice Kavanaugh came to the opposite

107. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 696 (1997) [hereinafter Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine] (“Not even the most
committed textualist would claim that statutory texts are inherently ‘plain on their
face,’ or that all interpretation takes place within the four corners of the Statutes at
Large.”).
108. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 103, at 33 (referring to “a reasonable reader,
fully competent in the language,” and explaining that “[t]he endeavor requires aptitude
in language, sound judgment, the suppression of personal preferences regarding the
outcome, and, with older texts, historical linguistic research”); Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 107, at 695; Michael Francus, Digital Realty, Legislative History,
and Textualism After Scalia, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 511, 518–19 (2019) (referring to “today’s textualism, known for its insistence on the primacy of text; use of dictionaries and canons;
and rejection of legislative history”); cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The
Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339–42, (1998)
[hereinafter Role of The Federalist] (arguing that modern textualists should “approach
The Federalist the same way a reasonable ratifier would have,” by looking to The Federalist as persuasive, not authoritative, evidence of the Constitution’s meaning).
109. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
110. Id. at 1738 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018)). In a separate dissent, Justice
Alito similarly interpreted the relevant statutory language on textualist grounds. See id.
at 1755–56, 1766–67 (Alito, J., dissenting); Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The triumph of
textualism: “Only the written word is the law”, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-onlythe-written-word-is-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/ET8S-58T3] (“In sum, the three Bostock
opinions are a master class in defining and applying textualism.”).
111. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (referring to “today’s holding” as being “that employers are prohibited from firing employees on the basis of homosexuality or
transgender status”).
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conclusion.112
Despite the potential for disagreement on some issues, textualists
generally agree on the proper approach to legal questions. Because
textualists understand the legislative process outlined in Article I,
Section 7 as the exclusive avenue for the people to express their will
through federal legislation, textualists do not look to legislative history to elucidate congressional intent.113 Nor do textualists rely on
views expressed by individual legislators after a law is enacted,
such as those views that are sometimes expressed in amicus briefs
or newspaper articles.114
Textualists reject those types of legislative materials because relying on them would allow individual legislators to delegate legislative authority to themselves by purporting to define a law’s
meaning outside of the Article I, Section 7 process.115 Additionally,
and more foundationally, such materials provide only a limited
and biased view into the intricate and complicated process that
turns proposed policies into law. That process, which requires bicameralism and presentment, necessitates collaboration and leads
to interrelated political bargains that can result in a final legislative
bargain (i.e., law).116 Different legislators (and the President
112. See id. at 1823 & n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]s written, Title
VII does not prohibit employment discrimination because of sexual orientation” and
that “[a]lthough this opinion does not separately analyze discrimination on the basis of
gender identity, this opinion’s legal analysis of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation would apply in much the same way to discrimination on the basis of gender
identity”).
113. See Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 186 (2017);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1528
(1998); see also Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 1, at 431.
114. Cf. Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 946 (2015) (arguing
that increased polarization will affect the nature of congressional amicus filings).
115. See Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 107, at 711.
116. Pursuant to Article I, Section 7’s bicameralism requirement, all bills must be approved by both chambers of Congress. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L. J. 523, 523 (1992). Pursuant to Article I, Section
7’s presentment requirement, all bills must be presented to the President, who can then
veto the bill (sending it back to Congress) or sign the bill into law. See id.

No. 2]

Who Determines Majorness?

485

exercising the veto power) have different opinions as to whether
one policy is more or less significant than another. Such opinions
are of no concern to textualists, who limit the relevant inquiry to
deciding what an objective reader would take a law’s enacted text
to mean.
B.

Congressional Determinations of Majorness

One way to conceptualize the major questions doctrine is to understand it as tasking courts to determine what Congress perceived
(or perceives) to be a major question. This theory could provide a
theoretical underpinning of the current major questions doctrine;
however, as Part II.C.1 shows, the theory does not track how the
major questions doctrine works in practice. But even if this first theory were a good fit for the current major questions doctrine, textualists should reject it as calling for a task that is both ordinarily futile
and statutorily suspect. The task is ordinarily futile because a collective Congress typically has no shared understanding as to which
policies are more politically significant than others. The task is statutorily suspect because it is based on the presumption that Congress wishes to keep major decisions for itself, despite that presumption being in conflict with the CRA.117
1.

Past or Present

If the major questions doctrine calls on courts to elucidate congressional determinations of majorness, courts must first determine
which Congress matters. There are two options. First, courts could
look to the enacting Congress—that is, focus on what Congress
would have considered to be major when Congress enacted the relevant text. Second, courts could focus on a later Congress—that is,
focus on what Congress would consider to be major at a later date,
such as when an agency issues a challenged rule or when a court
considers the legality of the challenged rule in a lawsuit.
For most textualists, the second option is quite easily dismissed;

117. See 5 U.S.C §§ 801–808 (2018).
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a law’s text has a particular public meaning when it is enacted.118
The only way Congress can change that meaning is to enact new
law through the Article I, Section 7 process. This protects private
parties, who are legally bound by the objective meaning of the law
when it was enacted, and who have the right to expect Congress to
speak though the Article I, Section 7 process when Congress wishes
to alter legal rights.119 The remainder of Part II.B will therefore work
118. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“This Court normally
interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time
of its enactment.”); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The ordinary meaning that
counts is the ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment . . . .”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 103, at 16 (“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to
reasonable people at the time they were written . . . .”); Role of The Federalist, supra note
108, at 1339 (“Textualists subscribe to an objective theory of interpretation, pursuant to
which interpreters ask what a reasonable lawmaker, familiar with the relevant context,
would have believed that he or she was voting for.”); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?,
91 VA. L. REV. 347, 367–68 (2005) (“When interpreting old statutes, moreover, the typical
textualist judge seeks to unearth the statutes’ original meanings rather than enforcing
whatever modern readers might take the statutes’ language to mean.”).
In the sense that textualism requires looking to the original public meaning of a law,
textualism is essentially indistinguishable from originalism. See ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT
AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO ORIGINALISM 131 (2017) (“My general point
is that if originalism means looking at the text, the historical background, the historical
purposes, the intent of the authors, linguistic conventions, and so on to try to assess
what the words of the Constitution (or any legal text) mean, and subsequently what
legal effect that meaning has, then that seems no different than textualism.”). But see
J.T. Hutchens, A New New Textualism: Why Textualists Should Not Be Originalists, 16 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 115 (2006) (proposing “evolutionary textualism” pursuant to
which “court[s] should interpret the law through the eyes of the reasonable, presentday (that is, at the time of interpretation) target of the legislation”).
119. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (referring to “the right to continue relying on the
original meaning of the law [that the people] have counted on to settle their rights and
obligations”); id. at 1749 (“The people are entitled to rely on the law as written, without
fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extratextual consideration.”); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Citizens and legislators must be able
to ascertain the law by reading the words of the statute. Both the rule of law and democratic accountability badly suffer when a court adopts a hidden or obscure interpretation of the law, and not its ordinary meaning.”); Nelson, supra note 118, at 352
(“[E]mphasizing . . . that people should not be held to legal requirements of which they
lacked fair notice, textualists suggest that interpretation should focus ‘upon what the
text would reasonably be understood to mean, rather than upon what it was intended
to mean.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
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under the assumption that, if textualists are to accept the first theory of the major questions doctrine, the doctrine must at least call
on courts to focus their inquiry on the last time Congress spoke to
the issue through enacted law.120 Even limiting the inquiry to the
enacting Congress, however, proves to be incompatible with textualism.
2.

Ordinarily Futile

Today, for a bill to become a law, it must first obtain majority
support from a 435-member House of Representatives and a 100member Senate.121 After that, the bill must be presented to the President, who may sign the bill into law or veto the bill and return it
back to Congress.122 These bicameralism and presentment requirements are mandated by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution,123
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 129, 144)); Note, Textualism as Fair
Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 557 (2009) (defending textualism as providing fair notice
and thereby protecting “the importance of interpreting laws as their subjects would
fairly have expected them to apply.”); Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e are a government of laws, not of men, and are
governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.”).
120. This does not preclude textualist jurists from performing the “’classic judicial
task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to “make sense” in
combination.’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000)
(quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)). Where the Article I, Section
7 process results in new objectified intent as exhibited in new law, such law must be
faithfully applied by courts. But see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240
(1995) (describing limits on Congress’s ability to intrude on the judicial power by purporting to reopen final judgments through new statutes).
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat.
21, 26–27 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2018)).
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The President need not formally issue a veto in
order to influence the legislative process, but may instead simply signal an intention to
veto a bill should the opportunity present itself. See Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 88 (2007) (noting
that “the President may help shape legislation prior to presentment” by, among other
things, “threaten[ing] to veto legislation” on either legal or political grounds).
123. Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides:
All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bills.
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and advance the Framers’ belief “that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.”124 As Justice Gorsuch explained it, “Article
I’s detailed processes for new laws were . . . designed to promote
deliberation.”125 Influenced by the writings of Locke and Montesquieu, the Framers created a “Constitution reflect[ing] a political
theory that places representative, collective lawmaking power at
the foundation of political society.”126
Given the wide cast of political actors involved in the Article I,
Section 7 process, textualists consider it nonsensical to ask whether
“Congress” (as a single entity) views a particular policy as being

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after
such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it
shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House,
it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be
determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved
by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
124. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949 (1983); see also John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s
Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1919 (2015) [hereinafter Inside Congress’s Mind] (“The
numerous veto gates erected by the rules of the two Houses build in a bias against
enactment, so each bill has a thousand ways to die.”).
125. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
126. Neomi Rao, Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress In The Structural Constitution, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2018) (citing Gordon S. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 151–52, 162 (1969)).
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major.127 Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”128 Each legislator might
weigh the value of a particular policy differently—indeed, that is
often how the collective lawmaking process functions.129 And because each legislator has his or her own “list[] of desires, priorities,
and preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible,
to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”130
Even if courts could unearth a shared hierarchy of majorness by
unraveling the many political bargains that led to a law’s enacted
text, the task becomes more difficult over time. Interpreting the
meaning of old texts is already difficult enough; attempting to recreate the political bargains that resulted in such texts is harder
yet.131 This additional, practical concern is of particular note where,
127. See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 10, at 52 (arguing from a textualist perspective
that the elephants-in-mouseholes’ “searching for a comprehensive purpose is often a
futile exercise”). Such “intent skepticism” is not limited to textualists, but is instead
shared by scholars belonging to other schools of thought such as legal realism, modern
pragmatism, Dworkinian constructivism, and Legal Process purposivism. See Inside
Congress’s Mind, supra note 124, at 1917–24; Loshin & Nielson, supra note 10, at 50 (“One
need not be a card-carrying textualist, however, to acknowledge that the legislative
process is complicated and that legislation is often the result of many congressional
compromises, which are reflected in statutory text.”); John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2400 (2017) (“In work ranging from
legal realism to Legal Process purposivism to the formalist ‘new textualism,’ a long line
of Harvard judges and law professors have resisted that intentionalist frame of analysis.”).
128. But see Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979, 982, 999–1000 (2017) (referring to, and arguing against, the “common refrain” that
Congress is a “they,” not an “it”).
129. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 103, at 22 (“[I]t is precisely because people
differ over what is sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who will write our
laws—and expect courts to observe what has been written.”).
130. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983).
131. See Role of The Federalist, supra note 108, at 1365 (“To the extent that it is possible
for twentieth-century judges to make sense of the implications of the text, structure,
and history of so old a document, the task, done well, is not a simple one.”). But see Neil
M. Gorsuch, Justice Neil Gorsuch: Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the Constitution,
TIME (Sept. 6, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5670400/justice–neil–gorsuch–why–
originalism–is–the–best–approach–to–the–constitution/
[https://perma.cc/GCY9MU3Y] (“Living constitutionalists often complain we can’t know the original understanding because the document’s too old and cryptic. Hardly. We figure out the original meaning of old and difficult texts all the time. Just ask any English professor who
teaches Shakespeare or Beowulf.”).
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as is often the case, an agency traces its authority to a decades-old
statute.132 Searching such historical statutes for a shared hierarchy
of majorness would require courts to inquire into long-forgotten
political controversies, raising the real possibility of anachronistic
analyses.133 Such practical difficulties provide textualists with an
additional reason to reject any attempt to engage in the ordinarily
futile task of assigning a shared hierarchy of majorness to Congress
as a whole.134
132. See Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L.
REV. 1931, 1941 (2020) (“Agencies using their delegated power are often drawing on
statutory authority granted many years (or decades) earlier.”).
133. See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641, 680 (2013) (“That is why these arguments are inherently anachronistic. People
in the past did not know how the future would turn out; therefore they did not understand themselves or their actions in terms of the narratives we craft today.”).
134. The adjective “ordinarily” is used to acknowledge the theoretical possibility that
Congress could provide a codified majorness determination within a statute’s enacted
text. For example, Congress could enact a law stating that “Agency A has the authority
to regulate technological widgets,” and stating further that “regulating Widget X is a
matter of non-major significance.” In that hypothetical, even textualists would admit
that Congress’s majorness determination could be readily elucidated since it was enacted into law. Such hypothetical examples are examined in greater detail in Parts II.C.2
and III.C.3, where the examples are used to highlight the consequences of courts having
the authority to determine majorness for themselves. But it is worthwhile to here briefly
explain why, if the major questions doctrine were to call for congressional determinations of majorness, the theoretical possibility that Congress could enact majorness determinations into law does not save the major questions doctrine from being unacceptable to textualists.
The problem lies in the relative uselessness of Congress offering boilerplate codifications of majorness in an enacted law. If Congress had the foresight to state that “regulating Widget X is a matter of non-major significance,” Congress could have just as
easily answered the underlying delegation question more directly by stating that
“Agency A is delegated the authority to regulate Widget X.” But of course, the major
questions and nondelegation doctrines exist because Congress does not always have
such foresight. Put differently, to say that a major questions doctrine tasking courts
with elucidating congressional determinations of majorness could be acceptable to textualists because Congress could theoretically speak to a policy question’s majorness
ignores the reality that the only set of cases in which the major questions doctrine is
helpful is the set of cases where Congress did not speak directly to the particular question at hand.
More foundationally, as far as the major questions doctrine is concerned, the legal
effect of Congress stating (A) “regulating Widget X is a matter of non-major
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Statutorily Suspect

Not only is assigning a shared hierarchy of majorness to Congress
an ordinarily futile task, it is also a task premised on a statutorily
suspect presumption. As previously mentioned, the current major
questions doctrine is premised on the “presumption that Congress
intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.”135 But that judicially crafted presumption is in
tension with the CRA,136 within which Congress established a presumption that all “major rules” must be given legal effect unless
Congress affirmatively enacts a new law stating that a particular
major rule should not be given legal effect. In short, where the major questions doctrine presumes that Congress wishes to answer
major questions itself, the CRA exhibits a congressional presumption that agencies will answer major questions through major rules.
Enacted in 1996, the CRA provides that “[b]efore a rule can take
effect, the Federal agency promulgating such rule shall submit to
each House of the Congress . . . a report containing—(i) a copy of
the rule; (ii) a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and (iii) the proposed effective date of

significance,” is the same as the legal effect of Congress stating (B) “Agency A is delegated the authority to regulate Widget X.” In both instances, Agency A has the authority to regulate Widget X. Since the legal effect between those two alternatives is the
same, textualist jurists would need to identify some reason, based in the text of the Constitution or other relevant law, justifying the requirement that Congress use the judicially-preferred language laid out in alternative (A). As Professor John F. Manning has
argued, “clear statement rules . . . impose something of a clarity tax upon legislative
proceedings,” and such a tax “demand[s] a justification other than the raw expression
of judicial value preferences.” John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 403 (2010). Put differently, textualists do not understand
the judicial task as permitting courts to order Congress to use specific language just for
kicks. Instead, textualists understand the judicial task as calling only for the interpretation of the words that Congress and the President have themselves settled upon during
the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process—a process affording courts no opportunity
to express bare policy preferences.
135. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
136. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2018).
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the rule.”137 The CRA’s definition of “major rule” is strikingly similar to the major questions doctrine’s definition of “major questions.”138 The CRA defines “major rule” as follows:
The term “major rule” means any rule that [the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)] finds has
resulted in or is likely to result in—
(A) an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or
more;
(B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers,
individual industries, Federal, State, or local government
agencies, or geographic regions; or
(C) significant adverse effects on competition,
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on
the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete
with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export
markets.
The term does not include any rule promulgated under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the amendments
made by that Act.139

Both the CRA and the major questions doctrine speak to economic significance (subsections (A) and (B) in the CRA provision
above) as well as political significance (subsection (C) in the CRA
provision above).140
In enacting the CRA, Congress tasked OIRA with applying the
statutory definition of “major rule” to determine whether any particular rule qualifies as major.141 Major rules, according to Congress,
must be given legal effect sixty days after the agency transmits the
137. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). For discussions on a perceived impetus for
the CRA, see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POLY. 187, 197 n.21 (2018); Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2164 (2009).
138. The major questions doctrine defines major questions as those with “economic
and political significance.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
160 (2000).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018).
140. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S. at 160 (referring to “economic and political
significance”).
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018).
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rule to Congress or publishes the rule in the Federal Register; the
only exception mentioned in the CRA is if Congress affirmatively
enacts a new law disapproving of the major rule.142 The CRA carefully outlines the procedural steps that Congress may take to disapprove of a major rule.143 For example, the CRA states that a new
law disapproving of a major rule should explicitly state “‘[t]hat
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the __ relating to __,
and such rule shall have no force or effect.’ (The blank spaces being
appropriately filled in).”144
The judge-made presumption in the major questions doctrine
threatens to turn the CRA’s detailed sixty-day disapproval process
on its head to instead require Congress to take special steps to approve an agency’s major rule. There are legislative proposals before
Congress that would achieve a similar result.145 If Congress were to
enact such proposals, courts could more credibly claim that Congress generally intends to retain an exclusive authority to decide
major questions. But until such proposals are enacted, courts
should not purport to “protect” an allegedly implicit congressional
intent to retain the exclusive authority to decide major questions
when the CRA explicitly anticipates that agencies will decide major
questions through major rules.
142. See id. § 801(a)(3). Rules determined to be non-major are also set to go automatically into effect, although they do so without any added delay. See id. § 801(a)(4) (“Except for a major rule, a rule shall take effect as otherwise provided by law after submission to Congress . . . .”).
143. See id. § 801(a) (referring to a “joint resolution”); id. § 801(a)(3)(B) (referring to
the presidential veto process); Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2169 (2009) (referring to “the presentment requirement of the
CRA”).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2018) (parenthetical in original).
145. See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2019 H. R.
3972, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter “REINS Act”]. The REINS Act would amend the
CRA to require congressional approval for major rules. See id. § 801. Non-major rules
would still go into effect unless explicitly disapproved by Congress. See id. § 803. The
REINS Act was first introduced into Congress nearly a decade ago, and has been reintroduced since. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency
Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 133 (2013); Press Release, Senators Reintroduce REINS Act (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.paul.senate.gov/news/senators-reintroduce-reins-act-0 [https://perma.cc/3P6S-FWVF].
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To be sure, it is theoretically possible for the major questions doctrine to be consistent with the CRA. Although the CRA presupposes agency authority to issue major rules, it could be that Congress only intends to elsewhere grant such major authority. In other
words, it could be that the CRA presumes that some agencies may
issue major rules, so long as Congress has elsewhere given those
agencies the explicit statutory authority to do so. But that attempt
to harmonize the major questions doctrine with the CRA must take
on the heavy burden of overcoming the CRA’s broad definition of
“Federal agency.”146
The CRA’s definition of “Federal agency” essentially covers all
federal agencies, even “historically independent agencies.”147 Given
as much, the CRA’s presumption that federal agencies will answer
major questions through major rules is not a narrow presumption
limited to a small number of agencies that are elsewhere provided
with major authority. Instead, the CRA’s broad definition of “Federal agency” suggests that the CRA anticipates major questions being answered through major rules issued by nearly every federal
agency. In light of the CRA’s wide-reaching presumption, it is difficult for courts to maintain that the major questions doctrine is
146. The CRA applies to each “Federal agency” as that term is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(1) (2018) (“The term ‘Federal agency’ means
any agency as that term is defined in section 551(1).”). The Administrative Procedure
Act, in turn, defines the term quite broadly. See id. § 551(1) (“‘[A]gency’ means each
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject
to review by another agency, but does not include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of
the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements
of section 552 of this title—(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of
representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them; (F)
courts martial and military commissions; (G) military authority exercised in the field in
time of war or in occupied territory; or (H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739,
1743, and 1744 of title 12; subchapter II of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884, 1891–
1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50, appendix.”).
147. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Memorandum for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies: Guidance on Compliance with the Congressional Review Act, M-19-14, 2 (Apr. 11, 2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2WW-WXDR] [hereinafter CRA
Guidance].

No. 2]

Who Determines Majorness?

495

only a statutory canon seeking to protect a congressional desire to
in most instances retain the authority to answer major questions.148
C.

Judicial Determinations of Majorness

A second way to conceptualize the major questions doctrine is to
understand it as calling for courts to determine majorness themselves. Pursuant to that understanding of the doctrine, a court’s
task is to exercise its own political discretion to determine whether
a policy question is major. As a descriptive matter, this second theory best explains how the major questions doctrine currently works
in practice. This second theory also describes how a strengthened
major questions doctrine might operate in the future. Textualists
should reject this understanding of the major questions doctrine as
impermissibly permitting courts to insert themselves into the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. This objection applies to both
the current and strengthened form of the major questions doctrine,
albeit in slightly different ways.
In the current version of the major questions doctrine, allowing
courts to decide majorness is to empower courts to selectively demand that explicit legislative language be used to delegate the authority to answer those questions that courts determine to be major.
That authority is similar to how a President might threaten to veto
a bill that does not satisfactorily address those topics that the President deems to be of particular political significance. But unlike a
148. Another way to try to harmonize the CRA with the major questions doctrine is
to argue that Congress did not intend the judiciary to pay much attention to OIRA’s
determinations of majorness. Indeed, the CRA provides that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under [the CRA] shall be subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 805 (2018). But even if OIRA’s determinations are not judicially reviewable, one might
presume the Court to at least refer to OIRA’s determinations if the Court were seeking
to elucidate congressional determinations of majorness so that Congress’s delegatory
decision could be respected. For similar reasons, even if the Court did not understand
OIRA’s congressionally mandated determinations to be perfect substitutes for congressional determinations of majorness, one who understands the major questions doctrine
as calling on courts to elucidate congressional determinations of majorness might expect the Court to at least note that Congress has spoken to what is “major” in the CRA.
See CRA Guidance, supra note 147, at 4 (referring to OIRA’s “statutory duty” to make the
necessary majorness determination).
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President who might threaten an overridable veto in return for different legislative language, the power exercised by courts invoking
the current form of major questions doctrine is supreme. That is to
say, even if all of Congress disagreed with a court as to whether a
policy question was major, the court could disregard Congress’s
political calculation and continue to require that a particular delegation be made more clearly.
In the strengthened form of the doctrine, to allow courts to decide
majorness is to similarly empower courts to selectively prohibit
Congress from delegating the authority to answer those questions
that courts determine to be major. In this sense, the courts are again
empowered to act similarly to the President, who for idiosyncratically held political reasons may veto a bill and prevent it from becoming law. But unlike the President’s veto, which may be overridden by a super-majority in Congress, the judicial veto exercised by
a court invoking a strengthened major questions doctrine would be
supreme. Congress could never delegate the authority to answer
questions determined by the courts to be major—even if Congress
made its delegation explicit, and even if all of Congress disagreed
as to whether a particular question was major.
1.

Descriptive Account

Before outlining the specific objections to a major questions doctrine empowering courts to determine majorness, it is helpful to evidence how, in practice, the major questions doctrine already empowers just that.149 Take for example MCI and Brown & Williamson,
which the Court has colorfully cited for the proposition that “Congress . . . does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”150 In both
cases the Court purported to define the relevant “elephant” for itself. In neither case did the Court even suggest that it was seeking
to determine what Congress would understand to be an

149. See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 10, at 48 (arguing that the “elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine” places the court “on a dangerous path to ‘I know it when I see it’”).
150. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Telegram Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)).
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“elephant,” even though one might assume that to be the relevant
inquiry if one were aiming to protect Congress’s unspoken desire
to keep the “elephants” for itself.
“[W]e think,” the Court wrote in MCI, that “an elimination of the
crucial provision of the statute for 40% of a major sector of the industry is much too extensive to be considered a ‘modification.’”151
In coming to that decision, the Court determined for itself that: (1)
the relevant statutory provision was more “crucial” than the rest of
the statute; (2) the relevant industry sector was a “major” one; and
(3) “40%” of that sector was a meaningful percent.152
Similarly, in Brown & Williamson, the Court noted that “[W]e are
confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion.”153 True, that passage refers to what “Congress . . . intended,” suggesting that the Court may have been concerned with elucidating and respecting a congressional decision.
But a closer reading reveals that the Court was at most concerned
with Congress’s decision to use “cryptic” text. It was the Court that
determined the threshold question of majorness—that is, that regulating tobacco would be of “great economic and political significance.”154 Although the Court’s “confiden[ce]” was bolstered by
“the plain implication of Congress’s subsequent tobacco-specific
legislation,”155 those later-enacted statutes are best understood as
speaking to the size of the relevant “mousehole,” not the “elephant.” Less illustratively, the Court first determined for itself that
the regulation of tobacco was a major question. Then, after deciding
majorness, the Court looked to the statutory grants of “drug” and
“device.”156 In examining those statutory grants, the Court concluded that, in light of its own majorness determination and Congress’s later-enacted statutes, the statutory grants were “cryptic” at
151. MCI, 512 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 131.
153. 529 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 131.
156. Id.
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best.157
Consider also King, where the Court determined for itself that
“[t]he tax credits are among the [Affordable Care] Act’s key reforms.”158 Nowhere did Congress itself identify those tax credits as
being “key.” To be sure, the Court hypothesized that “had Congress wished to assign” a question of such “deep economic and political significance . . . to an agency, it surely would have done so
expressly.”159 This could suggest an attempt to elucidate and respect a congressional decision, at least if taken at face value. But
157. Id. at 160. The Brown & Williamson majority cited to a 1986 article published by
then-Judge Breyer, in which he argued that a “court may . . . ask whether the legal question is an important one.” Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) [hereinafter Judicial Review] (emphasis added). The
Brown & Williamson majority cited then-Judge Breyer’s article to support the proposition that, “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 159 (citing Judicial Review, supra, at 370). It is unclear whether then-Judge
Breyer’s early conception of the major questions doctrine calls for judicial or congressional determinations of majorness. To be sure, the above-quoted language from his
1986 article states that “court[s]” can ask whether the legal question is major. Judicial
Review, supra, at 370. But then-Judge Breyer elaborated on that rationale by arguing that
“Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while
leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.” Id. (emphasis added). Regardless of what then-Judge Breyer would have
thought, Justice Breyer has distanced himself from the major questions doctrine on at
least one notable occasion. Dissenting in Brown & Williamson, Justice Breyer noted that
“if there is . . . a background canon” pursuant to which courts “should assume in close
cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators . . . . I do not believe [such a canon] controls the outcome here.” 529 U.S. at 190
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part
1): Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t, 103d Cong. 69 (1994)).
Scholars have described Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brown & Williamson as being in tension with his 1986 article. See Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions
Doctrine, 68 ADMIN L. REV. 445, 459 (2016) (“Breyer dissented [in Brown & Williamson],
contradicting his 1986 article by arguing that tobacco regulation is such a major political
question that it is appropriately addressed by one of the politically-accountable
branches—whether it be Congress or the Executive Branch—rather than the courts.”);
Chevron Step Zero, supra note 50, at 242 (“[Justice Breyer’s] argument [in Brown & Williamson] casts serious doubt on his own claims to the contrary in 1986.”).
158. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015).
159. Id. at 486.
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again, in practice it was the Court that first determined for itself
that the question was “deep” (i.e., major). Only then, after the Court
had determined the question to be “deep,” did the Court look for
express statutory language.160 Examples such as King make clear
that the major questions doctrine is not used to help determine
whether Congress has delegated authority in the past. The doctrine
is instead used to issue a forward-looking mandate establishing
that now, after the Court has identified a question to be major, Congress must use judicially-preferred language (i.e., explicit language)
if Congress wishes to delegate the authority to decide that question.
Similarly, in UARG, it was again the Court itself that identified
the EPA’s proposed statutory interpretation as “bring[ing] about an
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority.”161 The Court also determined for itself that the EPA was
seeking to “regulate a significant portion of the American economy.”162 Nowhere did the Court suggest that it was channeling
Congress’s viewpoint as to which rules were “enormous” or “significant.”163 The Court was instead concerned with declaring what
it thought to be major so that Congress was put on notice of the
judicial mandate to use explicit language as to certain questions.
Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion in United States Telecom Ass’n is
particularly instructive since it showcases a lower court judge seeking to faithfully apply Supreme Court precedent. Recall that thenJudge Kavanaugh considered two questions: “(1) Is the net neutrality rule a major rule? (2) If so, has Congress clearly authorized the
FCC to issue the net neutrality rule?”164 Note that, in the first question, then-Judge Kavanaugh asked whether the rule “[i]s” major.
The second question, by comparison, focused on what “Congress”
had decided to do. Juxtaposing those two questions leaves the impression that then-Judge Kavanaugh understood majorness to be
160. Id.
161. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
162. Id. (quotations omitted).
163. Id.
164. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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something that courts determine for themselves.165 Indeed, in conceding that the majorness inquiry had “a bit of a ‘know it when you
see it’ quality,”166 then-Judge Kavanaugh harkened back to Justice
Stewart’s infamous test for the judicial-identification of obscene materials.167
Understanding the current major questions doctrine as a call for
judicial determinations of majorness could explain why the Court
has not yet cited the CRA in any major questions doctrine case. The
CRA would seem to be particularly on point if one were seeking to
elucidate and respect congressional determinations of majorness.
As noted in Part II.B.3, both the major questions doctrine’s definition of “major question”168 and the CRA’s definition of “major rule”
speak to political169 and economic170 indications of majorness. Like
the major questions doctrine’s focus on “economic and political significance,”171 the CRA’s major rule requirement considers “a rule’s
relative importance and economic impacts.”172 In light of the similarity between the CRA and the major questions doctrine, the
Court’s failure to cite the CRA in any case involving the major
165. See also Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1435–36 (2018)
(examining then-Judge Kavanaugh’s views on majorness).
166. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
167. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.”).
168. The major questions doctrine defines major questions as those with “economic
and political significance.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
160 (2000).
169. The CRA’s definition of “major rule” includes those rules found to have “significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprises in domestic and export markets.” 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)(C) (2018).
170. The CRA’s definition of “major rule” also includes those rules found to have “an
annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more” as well as those rules found to
have “a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal,
State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions.” Id. § 804(2)(A)–(B).
171. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
172. CRA Guidance, supra note 147, at 2. OIRA is housed within the Office of Management and Budget. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (2018).
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questions doctrine suggests that the Court is not concerned with
elucidating congressional determinations of majorness so that Congress’s delegatory decisions may be respected.
Consider again Brown & Williamson, which involved an FDA tobacco rule issued less than five months after the CRA was enacted.173 Pursuant to the CRA, OIRA determined the FDA’s tobacco
rule to be “major.”174 Although the Court similarly determined that
the rule was of “economic and political significance,” the Court
made no mention of OIRA’s congressionally mandated determination.175 Consider also UARG, where the Court and OIRA were again
in agreement: the rule was major.176 But again, like in Brown & Williamson, the UARG Court made no reference to OIRA’s determination.
The most informative case for present purposes, however, is the
Supreme Court’s opinion in King. In that case, OIRA and the Court
were in disagreement. Applying Congress’s definition of “major
rule,” OIRA determined the IRS rule at issue to be “Non-Major.”177
By contrast, the King Court determined the rule to have answered
“a question of deep ‘economic and political significance.’”178 The
King Court’s implicit rejection of OIRA’s congressionally mandated
majorness determination provides even stronger evidence that,
173. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,395 (Aug. 28, 1996). The CRA was signed into law on March
29, 1996. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No 104-121, 110 Stat. 874 (1996). The FDA’s
Tobacco Rule was the thirty-third rule ever reviewed under the CRA. Congressional Review Act: Database of Rules, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://tinyurl.com/y9kjxocc [https://perma.cc/QU8C-T22C].
174. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
https://www.gao.gov/fedrules/103281 [https://perma.cc/SEA4-B9EB].
175. Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S. at 160.
176. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
https://www.gao.gov/fedrules/161898
[https://perma.cc/QNU8-398X]; see generally Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S.
302 (2014).
177. U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, U.S.
GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
https://www.gao.gov/fedrules/171784
[https://perma.cc/69PP-7XNA].
178. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
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when determining majorness, the Court does not purport to be elucidating congressional determinations of majorness in an attempt
to determine whether Congress has delegated authority.179 As King
illustrates, the Court is instead concerned with announcing its own
majorness determination so that Congress is on notice to legislate
accordingly.180
2.

Political Veto

Having established that the current form of the major questions
doctrine is best understood as tasking courts with determining majorness for themselves, this Article will now explain why textualists
should reject that task. Explaining as much is of increased importance since the strengthened form of the major questions doctrine is also best understood as tasking courts with determining majorness themselves. Textualists should reject the task both as it
179. Then-Judge Kavanaugh similarly did not cite the CRA in U.S. Telecom Ass’n. His
non-cite is interesting because, by referring to the “major rules doctrine (usually called
the major questions doctrine),” one might have expected him to acknowledge that the
CRA explicitly addressed “major rules.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). But
then-Judge Kavanaugh may have avoided referencing the CRA for two reasons. First
is that, prior to 2019, “historically independent agencies” (such as the FCC) did not
submit rules for OIRA review. See CRA Guidance, supra note 147, at 2 (“The CRA applies
to all Federal agencies, including the historically independent agencies.”). Second is
that the CRA’s definition of “major rule” specifically excludes rules promulgated pursuant to the Telecommunications Act amendments, which the FCC had traced its net
neutrality authority to. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 47, Chapter 5 of the U.S.
Code.); 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018) (“The term [“major rule”] does not include any rule
promulgated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the amendments made
by that Act.”); U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 417 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause Congress never passed net neutrality legislation, the FCC relied on the 1934 Communications Act, as amended in 1996, as its source of authority for the net neutrality rule.”).
180. At the end of the day, it might be that the King Court failed to acknowledge the
CRA because the Court was simply unaware of how the statute might interact with the
major questions doctrine. Indeed, the parties failed to raise the CRA in their Supreme
Court merits briefing. See generally Brief for Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473
(2015) (No. 14-114); Brief for Respondents, King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14114); Reply Brief for Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14-114). Another possibility is that the Court is simply unaware of the CRA’s potential significance,
or at least has not had the opportunity to formally consider the question.
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exists in the current and strengthened forms of the doctrine. In both
instances, the objection is that the major questions doctrine purports to provide the judiciary with an unenumerated political veto
power, although that veto appears slightly different in each form of
the major questions doctrine.
Before outlining the precise contours of the veto, it is critical to
first explain why the veto is best understood as purporting to empower courts to act politically, rather than legally. After all, courts
exercising the power of judicial review might also be understood as
“vetoing” a law, although for legal (rather than political) reasons.
The political nature of the veto power provided to courts in the current and strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine is
therefore central to the textualist’s objection to it.181
The political nature of the major questions doctrine’s veto is perhaps most obviously exhibited by the doctrine’s explicit call to consider a question’s “political significance.”182 And the doctrine’s call
to additionally consider “economic” significance does not save the
inquiry from being political. To the contrary, the economic inquiry
highlights the majorness inquiry’s inherently political focus. In
many instances, a policy question’s economic significance is the
very characteristic driving its political significance. In King, for example, the Court appeared to define the Affordable Care Act’s tax
credits as being “key” political reforms because they involved “billions of dollars in spending.”183 Similarly, then-Judge Kavanaugh
181. Recent textualist objections to the judicial exercise of political discretion come
from Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh themselves. As Justice Gorsuch acknowledged
in Bostock, “[a]s judges we possess no special expertise or authority to declare for ourselves what a self-governing people should consider just or wise.” Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). Writing in dissent, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with
Justice Gorsuch’s distinguishing between judges and the peoples’ elected representatives: Allowing judicial decisions to be based on a judge’s “own policy views,” Justice
Kavanagh explained, would result in “the Judiciary . . . becom[ing] a democratically illegitimate super-legislature—unelected, and hijacking the important policy decisions
reserved by the Constitution to the people’s elected representatives.” Id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
182. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (referring
to “economic and political significance”).
183. King, 576 U.S. at 485.
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noted that the FCC’s net neutrality rule was major in part because
its “financial impact” was “staggering.”184
It is difficult to hypothesize a policy question that has both “major” economic significance and “non-major” political significance;
political debates quite regularly turn on the relevant price tag. But
should such a policy question exist, the major questions doctrine’s
call for a consideration of both “economic and political significance”
ensures the inquiry is necessarily political by definition.185
Besides, even if the major questions doctrine could be reoriented
so that courts could focus exclusively on economic concerns, textualists would be eager to see where in the Constitution it says that
Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers turns on economic
calculations. Such an argument would appear awfully close to constitutionalizing “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”186
184. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
185. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added); see also King, 576 U.S. at
486 (referring to “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” (emphasis
added) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (UARG)));
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (referring to “decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance’” (emphasis added) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160)).
Although this Article is primarily concerned with providing a textualist critique of
the major questions doctrine, empowering courts to exercise political discretion raises
concerns that are shared by textualists and non-textualists alike. Consider Professor
Adrian Vermeule, who is very much not a textualist. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/ [https://perma.cc/V79V-LM92]
(arguing in favor of “common-good constitutionalism” and calling it a “mistake” to
think “that the common good and its corollary principles have to be grounded in specific
texts”). Because Professor Vermeule understands the “lines between law, fact, and policy discretion” to be inherently “uncertain and unstable,” he takes issue with any attempt to draw a “sharp distinction between review of legal questions, on the one hand,
and review of facts and discretionary policymaking, on the other.” Adrian Vermeule,
Neo–?, 133 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 103, 107 (2020). From Professor Vermeule’s perspective, then, the incorrectness of a major questions doctrine’s call for judicial determinations of political majorness is all the more obvious—if judicial supremacy over mixed
questions of law and politics is a step too far, judicial supremacy over matters that the
judiciary explicitly defines to be questions of politics should be rejected out of hand.
186. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Rebecca L. Brown, The Art of Reading Lochner, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 570, 572 n.3 (2005)
(noting that “most readers” of Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent take it as “suggest[ing]
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In the current major questions doctrine, the judicial exercise of a
political veto takes the shape of a judicial mandate that Congress
speak explicitly if it wishes to delegate the authority to answer a
question that a court determines to be major. This is objectionable
to textualists since it risks upsetting the legislative bargains that result in particular words being enacted into law. Like a court invoking the current form of the major questions doctrine, individual legislators (and the President) are likely to have their own views as to
which policy questions are major. The culmination of those views
is reflected in the final wording of a particular statute, which might
have been intentionally drafted to implicitly delegate the authority
to answer certain questions. Consider a hypothetical.
Assume that Congress enacts a law delegating to Agency A the
authority to regulate “technological widgets.” Pursuant to that authority, Agency A promulgates a rule to regulate Widget X, which
Agency A understands to be “technological.” Manufacturers of
Widget X sue, alleging that its widgets are not “technological,” and
thus Agency A has no statutory authority to regulate Widget X. In
considering the case on appeal, the Supreme Court invokes the current form of the major questions doctrine and determines that, in
the Court’s opinion, the decision to regulate Widget X is a question
of major economic and political significance. For that reason, the
Court concludes that Congress failed to correctly (i.e., explicitly)
delegate to Agency A the authority to answer the question as to
whether Widget X should be regulated.
For the major questions doctrine to be doing any real work in the
above hypothetical, the Court must read (or anticipate having to
read) the statute as being broad enough to implicitly cover Widget
X. Otherwise the Court could brush the majorness inquiry to the
side and simply rule that, as a matter of straightforward statutory

that the Court was improperly resolving a constitutional dispute by favoring a contested tenet of economic theory”). But see Sohoni, supra note 165, at 1433 (reading King
as being limited to those instances where “the agency claims that a statute implicitly
delegates to the agency the power to cause large amounts of federal money to be
spent”).
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interpretation, Widget X is not covered by the statutory language.187
But by invoking the major questions doctrine, the Court risks favoring its political view (that the regulation of Widget X is a major policy question) over the views of legislators and the President who
might have approved broad language because they considered the
policy question to be a non-major question that did not need to be
specifically noted.
As Professor John F. Manning explains from a textualist’s perspective, “[m]uch legislation reflects the fruits of legislative compromise, and such compromises often lead to the articulation of
broad policies for agencies and courts to specify through application.”188 By narrowing the statute to not cover Widget X, the Court
in the above hypothetical “threatens to unsettle the legislative
choice implicit in adopting a broadly worded statute.”189 Moreover,
the Court’s narrowing of the statute additionally distorts the political process in the future. Politicians wishing to amend the statute
187. Even larger issues would arise if the Court truly treated the major questions
doctrine as a threshold issue that must be answered before the Court even considered
developing an opinion as to whether the statute is broad enough to cover Widget X.
That approach would require the Court to unnecessarily announce its political determinations in cases where the Court would not need do so (that is, in cases where the
statute does not cover the relevant agency action, regardless of its majorness). This approach is slightly distinguishable from King, where the Court ultimately concluded that
the statute was broad enough to cover the IRS’s proposed interpretation. See King, 135
S. Ct. at 2489–90.
188. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 228 (2000) [hereinafter Canon of Avoidance]; see also Substantive Canons, supra note 106, at 114 (referring to Professor Manning as “the most prominent academic
textualist”).
189. Canon of Avoidance, supra note 188, at 228; see also Countering, supra note 106, at
71 (“[W]ithin each house, ‘[b]ills are shaped by a process that entails committee approval, the scheduling of a floor vote, logrolling, the threat of filibuster, the potential
for presidential veto, and an assortment of other procedural obstacles.’ Passing these
veto gates requires proponents to compromise with opponents, and compromise can
produce awkward language.” (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2417 (2003))); Substantive Canons, supra note 106, at 120–21 (“For example, Justice Scalia’s suggestion that
clear statement rules reflect the ordinary use of language comes at the end of a long
passage characterizing them as ‘dice-loading rules’ that pose ‘a lot of trouble’ for the
‘honest textualist.’” (quoting SCALIA, supra note 105, at 27–29)).
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to explicitly cover Widget X may have to give up more political capital to earn the support of their colleagues who might have already
understood the original statute to cover Widget X, but who later
seize the opportunity to extract additional political deals in return
for explicit Widget X language.190
The political veto power which would be exercised by courts pursuant to a strengthened form of the major questions doctrine would
be even more objectionable from the textualist’s perspective. An
elaboration on the Widget X example helps illustrate why. Assume
that after the Court ruled that regulating Widget X involved a question of major economic and political significance, Congress sought
to make its delegatory intention clear. Specifically, assume that
Congress amended the relevant statute to state that “Agency A’s
authority to regulate technology widgets includes the authority to
regulate Widget X.” Agency A then promulgates a new Widget X
rule and litigation ensues. What now?
Pursuant to a strengthened major questions doctrine, the Court
would be empowered to hold that Congress cannot delegate to
Agency A the authority to decide whether Widget X will be regulated—even though Congress clearly expressed its intention to delegate that authority. Similar to a President who declares that a bill
cannot become law for political reasons, the Court in this hypothetical would be declaring that Congress’s delegation cannot be given
legal effect because the Court has determined it to be too politically
important.
The political veto power purportedly provided to courts in the
current and strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine
must be rejected by textualists because such veto power is nowhere
mentioned in Article I, Section 7. That Section of the Constitution,
which outlines the exclusive procedures through which federal law
may be enacted,191 was the subject of significant debate at the Constitutional Convention. The substantial influence that a political
veto (or “negative”) could exert on the legislative process was not
190. Cf. Countering, supra note 106, at 71–72 (“[I]t may be necessary to narrow or
broaden language in order to bring others on board.”).
191. The text of Article I, Section 7 is provided in its entirety at note 123.
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lost on the Framers. In an early draft of the Declaration of Independence, for example, Thomas Jefferson complained that King
George had “prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain” the slave trade.192 Familiar
with a veto’s utility, the Framers considered creating several different veto powers at the Constitutional Convention.193
Most important for present purposes was a proposal in the Virginia Plan to vest a political veto power in a “Council of Revision”
made up of the President and members of the federal judiciary.194
The proposal was not entirely novel; New York’s Constitution of
1777 had vested a veto power in a similarly constituted Council of
Revision.195 The New York Council, which was made up of the Governor, the state Chancellor, and the state justices, could veto any
legislative bill by majority vote.196
192. Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, (June 7–
Aug. 1, 1776,), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1760–1776, at 317–18 (1950).
193. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, What if Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional
World of Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41, 41–42 (2011) (“Madison argued that
the United States government must be armed with a ‘negative,’ or a veto, on state legislation. The negative would be vested in Congress—most likely the Senate—and
would operate as a broad check by the federal legislature on the states. Madison even
went so far as to suggest that congressional approval would be the ‘necessary final step’
in the states’ legislative processes.”(footnotes omitted) (quoting ALISON L. LACROIX,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 138–39, 153 (2010))).
194. James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1989) [hereinafter The Council of Revision].
195. See id. at 243. The New York Constitution of 1777 provided:
And whereas laws inconsistent with the spirit of this constitution, or with
the public good, may be hastily passed: Be it ordained that the governor for
the time being, the chancellor, and the judges of the supreme court, or any
two of them, together with the governor, shall be and hereby are, constituted
as a council to revise all bills to be passed into laws by the legislature . . . .
Id. at 244–45, quoted in BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1332
(GPO, 2d ed. 1878).
196. See The Council of Revision, supra note 194, at 245; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Common Law Court or Council of Revision?, 101 YALE L.J. 949, 951 (1992) (review of HARRY
H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1990)) (noting that the federal
Council of Revision “could have vetoed legislation on grounds of morality or prudence,
not just irreconcilability with constitutional commands.”); Richard Albert, The

No. 2]

Who Determines Majorness?

509

Modeling a federal proposal that was in part based on the New
York Council, the Virginia Plan presented at the Constitutional
Convention proposed in part:
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of
revision with authority to examine every act of the
National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of
a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be
final; and that the dissent of said Council shall amount to
a rejection, unless the act of the National Legislature be
again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again
negatived by [ ] of the members of each branch.197

The resolution was defeated after substantial debate.198 In The Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton provides “two strong reasons”
for why the resolution was defeated.199 First was that “judges, who
are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias,
from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities.”200 Second was that “by being often associated with the Executive, [judges] might be induced to embark too far in the political
views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might
by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments.”201
Hamilton’s second concern might have been addressed by an alternative framework proposed by Madison, which was itself the
subject of much debate.202 In the end the Framers settled on an
Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) (noting that the Council of Revision
had “a very broad power of review”).
197. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
198. See The Council of Revision, supra note 194, at 249–57.
199. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003); see also Albert, supra note 196, at 25 (listing “general objections” raised against
the Council of Revision).
200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 199, at 445.
201. Id.
202. Pursuant to Madison’s proposal, bills would have been separately sent to the
President and judiciary; either branch could then independently exercise a political
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Article I, Section 7 framework within which the President could exercise a “qualified” veto overridable by a super-majority in Congress.203 Missing from that Article I, Section 7 framework, of course,
was any vesting of a veto power in the federal judiciary.
This constitutional history illustrates what textualists already assume: enacted legal text is the end result of various political bargains.204 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[t]he procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of
Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises
that produced the Constitution itself.”205 Indeed, “[f]amiliar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the
power to enact statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.’”206
Respecting—even if not fully understanding—the constitutional
bargains that resulted in Article I, Section 7’s text requires textualists to reject the unenumerated political veto called for by the current and strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine.
In rejecting the major questions doctrine’s political veto, textualists are on sound precedential footing. Consider the fate of the
“one-house” veto examined in INS v. Chadha.207 In Chadha, Congress
had granted the Attorney General the discretion to determine
whether an otherwise removable alien could remain in the United
veto power. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 197, at 80. Presumably referring to
the similarity between Madison’s proposal and the Virginia Plan’s already-rejected
proposal for a council of revision, Elbridge Gerry argued that Madison’s proposal
“comes to the same thing with what has been already negatived.” Id. at 298. Charles
Pinckney similarly opposed Madison’s proposal, arguing that it would lead to “the interference of the Judges in the Legislative business” by “involv[ing] them in parties”
and “giv[ing] a previous tincture to their opinions.” Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
Madison’s proposal was rejected. The Council of Revision, supra note 194, at 257.
203. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 7, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 199, at 444.
204. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 59–60 n.237 (2001) (“[T]he debates concerning the Council of Revision” are not citable
as “authoritative evidence of the Founders’ ‘intent,’” but “are relevant precisely because their premises fit tightly with inferences that reasonably emerge from the constitutional structure itself.”).
205. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
206. Id. at 439–40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
207. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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States.208 Wishing to retain some influence over the Attorney General’s exercise of that discretion, the relevant statute purported to
reserve for each house of Congress the authority to independently
overrule the Attorney General’s determination.209 The Court referred to that power as a “veto,” and concluded that it unconstitutionally empowered an individual house of Congress to exercise
authority that Article I, Section 7 vested in the bicameral legislature.210
Consider also the “line-item” veto held unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York.211 The President’s constitutional veto is
thought to be an all-or-nothing authority in that it only permits the
President to accept or reject entire bills.212 But in Clinton, Congress
had sought to provide the President with the statutory authority to
veto particular portions of bills.213 The Court examined the “important differences between” that statutory authority and “the
President’s ‘return’ of a bill pursuant to [the veto process outlined
in] Article I, § 7.”214 In considering whether Congress could grant
the President the statutory authority to veto portions of bills, the
208. See id. at 923–24.
209. See id. at 925.
210. See id. at 951–59.
211. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
212. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every bill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it . . . .”).
213. See id. at 436. Some scholars have critiqued Clinton for focusing on Article I, Section 7 instead of the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 33, at 389
(“Under the Act [at issue in Clinton], the President signs the entire bill into law, but the
effective dates of certain portions of the law are made contingent on subsequent presidential action. The question is whether the President’s authority to determine effective
dates crosses the line from execution to legislation. That has nothing to do with the
procedures in Article I, Section 7 and everything to do with the nondelegation doctrine.”); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto:
A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of
New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 285–86, 290 (2001) (noting “the Court did not address
whether the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine” despite that question being “obvious,” and arguing “[t]he central problem with the Court’s opinion is its failure to
justify applying a stricter standard to the delegation of cancellation authority than to
other delegations to the executive.”).
214. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
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Court explained that there were “powerful reasons for construing
constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition.”215 Quoting Chadha, the Court concluded that the line-item veto was “not the product of the ‘finely
wrought’ procedure that the Framers designed.”216 Like in Chadha
and Clinton, where the Court rejected two novel veto powers not
referred to in Article I, Section 7, textualists should reject the political veto power purportedly vested in courts by the current and
strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine.
3.

Supreme Nature

As explained above, textualists should reject the current and
strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine for providing
courts with a political veto power. But the “supreme” nature of that
political veto should doubly trouble textualists. Both the current
and strengthened forms of the major questions doctrine purport to
provide the judiciary with a supreme political veto, although each
form of the doctrine presents textualists with distinct objections.
The veto provided to courts in the current major questions doctrine is supreme in the sense that it definitively withholds legal validity from implicit delegations of major authority. Consider a variation of the Widget X hypothetical mentioned above.217 Assume
that after the Court ruled that regulating Widget X involved a question of major economic and political significance, Congress expressed a conflicting view by amending the relevant statute to provide that “regulating Widget X is an issue of non-major political
and economic significance.” Were Agency A to issue a new Widget
X rule and were litigation to follow, the Court could invoke the current form of the major questions doctrine to refuse to credit Congress’s majorness determination. More concretely, the Court could
point to its own identification of the Widget X decision as being
major, and hold that Congress cannot delegate the authority to decide if Widget X will be regulated by Agency A—even if Congress
215. Id.
216. Id. at 440.
217. See supra Part II.C.2.
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disagreed with the Court as to whether that decision was of major
political importance. Unlike a presidential veto, which can be overriden by a supermajority in Congress,218 the Court’s declaration that
a particular question demands explicit legislative language could
never be challenged.
The supreme nature of this judicial veto power is even more obvious in a strengthened form of the major questions doctrine. To
best see how, consider one last variation of the Widget X example.
Assume that after the Court initially ruled that regulating Widget
X involved a question of major economic and political significance,
Congress made two amendments to the relevant statute: (1) an
amendment stating that “regulating Widget X is an issue of nonmajor political and economic significance”; and (2) an amendment
stating that “even if the decision to regulate Widget X were of major
political and economic significance, Agency A is hereby delegated
the authority to decide whether Widget X will be regulated.” Here
the Court could invoke the strengthened form of the major questions doctrine to again ignore Congress’s determinations. The
Court could forever ban Congress from delegating to Agency A the
authority to decide if Widget X should be regulated—even if Congress expressed its view that the authority involved answering only
a non-major question, and even if Congress made the delegation explicit. The only way Congress could ever delegate such authority in
the future would be if the Supreme Court, acting as what could only
be described as a super-legislature, changed its own political calculation and declared the question at hand to no longer be major. For
the textualist who takes the Article I, Section 7 process seriously,
the strengthened major questions doctrine’s supreme, unenumerated veto power—which purports to be stronger than the President’s qualified, enumerated veto power—must be rejected out of
hand.

218. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2. Even the veto exercised by the rejected Council of
Revision was inferior in the sense that it could be overridden by Congress. See Fallon,
supra note 196, at 958 & n.69 (citing 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 197, at 21); Albert,
supra note 196, at 22 (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III).
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PRE-DECISIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF IMPORTANCE

For the reasons outlined in Part II, textualists should reject the
major questions doctrine—including what the doctrine is said to be,
what the doctrine actually does in practice, and what the doctrine
might soon become. But textualists need not be ignorant of the fact
that some cases raise more important policy questions than others.
To the contrary, judicial considerations of “importance” are statutorily permissible in at least two pre-decisional contexts.
First, the Supreme Court may consider whether a case presents
an “important” question when the Court considers adding a case to
its discretionary docket.219 Second, federal courts of appeals may
consider a case’s “importance” when considering whether the case
is appropriate for en banc review.220 Because the exercise of discretion in those pre-decisional contexts has been implicitly approved
by Congress, those textualist jurists who wish to limit the nondelegation doctrine to “major” questions may in part do so by selecting
cases that present “important” questions in the certiorari and en
banc processes.221 In exercising such discretion, the Supreme Court
and en banc courts could largely limit their nondelegation holdings
to those cases raising “important” questions.

219. SUP. CT. R. 10(c).
220. FED R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
221. The term “in part” is used because there may be instances where courts may
nonetheless deem it appropriate to grant certiorari or en banc review in cases raising
non-important nondelegation questions. For example, a case might raise an important
issue unrelated to the nondelegation question in addition to raising a non-important
question related to the nondelegation doctrine. While courts may sometimes limit their
review to one issue at the exclusion of others, such limited review is not always appropriate or permissible. Moreover, the term “in part” is particularly appropriate in regard
to courts of appeals, which more frequently decide cases through three-judge panels
than through en banc sittings. Because three-judge panels do not typically have any
discretion in selecting the cases they decide, those panels cannot engage in the same
sort of “importance” inquiry applicable to the en banc selection process. Finally, “in
part” is used to recognize those categories of cases the Supreme Court remains required
to consider. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C § 1253 (2018) (direct appeals from decisions of three-judge
courts).
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Clarifying Points

Four clarifying points should be made before turning to address
how textualist jurists may consider importance in pre-decisional
contexts. The first clarifying point is that this Article perceives no
meaningful substantive difference between considerations of “importance” and considerations of “majorness.” Given as much, this
Article must clarify why textualists can engage in the first inquiry
but not the latter. This Article offers two reasons.
First, as further outlined below, there is clear (presumptively constitutional) statutory authority for courts to consider “importance”
in certain pre-decisional contexts.222 The judicially created major
questions doctrine, by comparison, provides no clear textual foundation for a court’s consideration of “majorness” when deciding
cases. A second reason is that, in considering “importance,” courts
do not purport to be exercising a supreme authority. Congress
could enact new statutes changing how the Supreme Court selects
the cases it will hear, and changing how the courts of appeals select

222. The phrase “presumptively constitutional” is used to acknowledge potential
constitutional issues, not addressed here, regarding the judiciary’s ability to draft its
own court rules and select the cases it will hear. See Edward H. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After The Judges Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1643, 1713–30 (2000) (examining the relationship of discretionary review with the classic justification for judicial review and the rule of law); Alexander Volokh, Judicial NonDelegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391,
1408 (2017) (listing the Rules Enabling Act as an example statute that “seem[s] to grant
courts wide discretion and invite or require them to engage in substantial lawmaking”);
Josh Blackman, Does the Rules Enabling Act violate the Non-Delegation Doctrine?, JOSH
BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Jan. 28. 2015), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/01/28/does-therules-enabling-act-violate-the-non-delegation-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/H3VUNWE4] (“Is there much of an intelligible principle [in the Rules Enabling Act] about
what kind of rules are to be prescribed for procedure and evidence? Other than the
adjective ‘general,’ I think the answer is no.”); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Discretionary Dockets, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 225–51 (2016) (examining the relationship between a court’s mode of decisionmaking, docket management, and sense of institutional role).
The narrow point here is only that, from the textualist’s perspective, pre-decisional
considerations of “importance” are less objectionable than those of “majorness.”
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cases for en banc review.223 For now, however, Congress has
granted courts the authority to exercise certain discretion over their
dockets, making the judicial exercise of such discretion less objectionable from the textualist’s perspective.
A second clarifying point is that, although courts may exercise
political discretion in the pre-decisional contexts described below,
such discretion must be distinguished from partisan behavior.224
For purposes of this Article, “political discretion” means the discretion to draw lines based on policy reasons (e.g., the XYZ Act affects
a lot of people), not partisan reasons (e.g., the XYZ Act is good for a
particular political party).
The third clarifying point, related to the second, is that courts
should be cognizant of the risk that judicial exercises of political
discretion may be perceived as being partisan. Avoiding even the
appearance of engaging in partisan behavior is important for the
judiciary, a branch particularly reliant on being perceived to be legitimate. As Alexander Hamilton explained, the judiciary has “neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”225 To meaningfully exercise that “judgment” without the assistance of the “sword” or
“purse,” the judiciary’s rulings must be (and be perceived to be)
non-partisan.226
The fourth clarifying point is that this Article assumes without
deciding that the nondelegation doctrine could be successfully revived. That is to say, this Article assumes that the nondelegation
doctrine could be revived in a way that does not require courts to

223. Melody Wang, Don’t Let the Court Choose Its Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/JW6V-U7RX] (“Just as Congress granted this power, so can Congress
take it away.”).
224. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 128
(2018) (“[L]egitimacy in judicial decision making therefore requires the Justices to rely
only on reasons that reasonable citizens would acknowledge as enjoying the status of
reasons—as distinguished from idiosyncratic, partisan, or narrowly theistic concerns—
even if they might reach different ultimate judgments.”).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003).
226. Id. at 466.

No. 2]

Who Determines Majorness?

517

exercise political discretion when deciding cases.227 Developing
such a revived doctrine would require much more thought than can
be provided here. The discussion which follows speaks only to how
a successfully revived nondelegation doctrine could at least be partially limited to “important” (i.e., major) questions without upsetting the entire endeavor by requiring courts to decide “majorness”
when actually deciding cases.
B.

Discretionary Docket

Historically, the Supreme Court was obliged to hear many
cases.228 Over the last two hundred years, however, Congress has
gradually granted the Supreme Court the authority to exercise
more discretion in selecting which cases it will hear.229 In accordance with those congressional grants of discretion, today the Rules
of the Supreme Court “indicate the character of the reasons the
Court considers” when granting petitions for a writ of certiorari.230
The rules provide that the Court is more likely to grant a petition if
the underlying case involves an “important” federal question.231
The precise meaning of “important” is left undefined by the Rules
of the Supreme Court.232 But case law establishes that, circularly, a
question is “important” when “at least four members of the Court”
227. See supra Part I.A (noting that the lack of a judicially manageable standard is
often attributed as a reason for the nondelegation doctrine’s underutilization).
228. See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705,
710 (2018) (“For the first century of its existence, the Supreme Court had no authority
to choose what cases it would decide.”); S. Sidney Ulmer, Revising the Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court: Mere Administrative Reform or Substantive Policy Change, 58 MINN. L. REV.
121, 124–26 (1973) (providing a historical account of obligatory jurisdiction).
229. For an account of the various historical statutes granting such discretion, see
Epps & Ortman, supra note 228, at 710–11.
230. SUP. CT. R. 10(c). The Court is clear to note that its stated reasons are “neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion.” Id.
231. Id.; Coenen & Davis, supra note 10, at 795 n.86 (“[T]he Court’s certiorari practice,
after all, directs it to consider a case’s national importance.”).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 151 (1963) (“[T]he decision below
involves an important question in the construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act.”);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The technical
validity of the procedures followed below does not implicate an open ‘important question of federal law.’” (quoting SUP. CT. R. 10(c))).
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deem the question “important.”233 And the broad judicial discretion
associated with certiorari is even more apparent where parties petition the Supreme Court before a lower federal court has issued its
final ruling. In those extraordinary instances, a petition will be
“granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative
public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in [the Supreme]
Court.”234
Textualists and non-textualists alike would no doubt call on the
Court to prudently exercise its discretion in the certiorari process.
It is doubtful, however, that an objective reader of the relevant certiorari statutes understands those statutes as requiring the Court to
select cases by figuratively throwing darts at the wall.235 Indeed,
given the scope of the Court’s influence, some political (not partisan) awareness may be helpful.
If the Court could decide an issue of law by granting one of two
petitions—the first of which concerns an area of law that the political branches are actively reshaping, and the second of which concerns an area of the law that is relatively stable—it might be preferable for the Court to decide the case by accepting the second petition. Doing so would allow the Court to decide the relevant legal
question without directly interfering with the active work of the
political branches. On the other hand, some might argue that the
Court should accept the first petition, on the theory that the extra
political attention could attract the interest of premier legal advocates or alert the political branches to a legal requirement that might
as well be addressed through the political process. Whether one
would argue in favor of the Court granting the first or second petition is irrelevant. The point is only that the relevant statutes make
233. Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955).
234. SUP. CT. R. 11 (emphasis added); see also BICKEL, supra note 1, at 126 (“The certiorari jurisdiction is professedly discretionary and based on few articulated standards.”).
235. For a proposal that could take power out of the hands of the Court, see Epps &
Ortman, supra note 228, at 707 (“[W]e propose that the Court—or Congress, by statute—
supplement the traditional certiorari docket with a small number of cases randomly
selected from final judgments of the circuit court.”).
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it such that textualist Justices (like their non-textualist colleagues)
may take such considerations into account when considering petitions for writs of certiorari.
By considering importance in the certiorari context, the Court
could shape its docket to in large part address only those nondelegation cases raising “important” (i.e., major) questions. In doing so
the Court could alert Congress to similar nondelegation issues presented in other statutes. Put differently: by holding one or two carefully selected statutes to be unconstitutional on nondelegation
grounds, the Court could alert Congress to the need to correct issues of nondelegation more broadly. As Justice Scalia explained in
the wake of the Benzene case, “[E]ven those who do not relish the
prospect of regular judicial enforcement of the . . . [non]delegation
doctrine might well support the Court’s making an example of
one—just one—of the many enactments that appear to violate the
principle. The educational effect on Congress might well be substantial.”236
The certiorari process provides the Court with an opportunity to
engage in the type of limited review to which Justice Scalia referred.
Encouraging Congress to address constitutional questions may
sound disagreeable to modern ears accustomed to the constitutional Muzak that is judicial supremacy. But the idea is far from
revolutionary: “In earlier times heated constitutional debate did
take place at the congressional level.”237
C.

En Banc Review

Although federal courts of appeals do not exercise much discretion in deciding which cases make up their general dockets, the
courts of appeals do have significant discretion in selecting cases
for en banc consideration. As background, federal courts of appeals
typically decide cases through randomly assembled three-judge

236. Scalia, supra note 34, at 28.
237. Id.
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panels.238 Although those panels have authority to rule on behalf of
the entire court, cases are sometimes heard or (more commonly) reheard by the entire en banc court.239 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 permits appellate judges to order en banc review where
“the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”240
Congress has given legal effect to that rule through the Rules Enabling Act—although the constitutionality of Congress’s outsourcing of rule drafting to the courts could itself be questioned on nondelegation grounds.241
Even if constitutional objections can be lodged against the Rules
Enabling Act, the narrow point here is that Congress’s having given
legal effect to Rule 35 makes the judicial exercise in discretion called
for in Rule 35 less objectionable to textualists than the discretion
exercised pursuant to the judge-made major questions doctrine. For
now it suffices to say that, in determining what constitutes “a question of exceptional importance,” Congress has granted to the courts
of appeals the authority to exercise broad discretion.242 Indeed, a
1998 amendment to Rule 35 changed language speaking to “when
238. See Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL
L. REV. 65, 66 (2017) (“It is common knowledge that the federal courts of appeals typically decide cases in panels of three judges.”).
239. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (referring to “hearing or rehearing”); Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2001, 2004 (2014).
240. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2) (emphasis added). In rare instances, judges may call for
en banc review before a panel has considered the merits in the first instance. See, e.g.,
Lorelei Laird, Hawaii asks to go straight to 9th Circuit en banc review of Trump travel ban
preliminary injunction, ABA J. (Apr. 12, 2017, 5:48 PM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/hawaii_asks_to_skip_straight_to_en_banc_review_of_trump_travel_ban_prelimin [https://perma.cc/K74F-CE6F] (describing “the
usual procedure, in which a three-judge panel makes the initial decision and the parties
have the option to appeal to the full court”).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2018) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66
UCLA L. REV. 654, 657 n.9 (2019) (explaining the process through which Congress oversees the judiciary’s rule creation process). But see Blackman, supra note 222 (questioning
the constitutionality of the Rules Enabling Act).
242. See Sadinsky, supra note 239, at 2018–20 (describing various courts’ considerations of “importance”).
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hearing or rehearing in banc will be ordered” to instead speak to
“when hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered.”243 That
amendment highlights the discretionary nature associated with ordering en banc review, pursuant to which courts of appeals may
exercise a form of discretion similar to that exercised by the Supreme Court in the certiorari process.244 By exercising such discretion, en banc courts could largely limit their nondelegation holdings to those statutes that the courts determine to present “important” (i.e., major) questions.
CONCLUSION
A threshold question relating to the major questions doctrine has
yet to be answered: Who determines majorness? One possible answer is that Congress decides what is major. Indeed, that answer
appears to be an implicit presumption underlying the current major
questions doctrine, pursuant to which courts are understood as determining whether Congress has delegated authority. But if Congress determines majorness, textualists should reject the major
questions doctrine as calling on courts to complete a task that is ordinarily futile and statutorily suspect.
A second possible answer to the threshold question is that the
courts determine majorness for themselves. That answer best describes how the major questions doctrine currently works in practice. The answer also describes how a strengthened form of the doctrine might be used in the future as part of a revived nondelegation
doctrine. But if courts are to determine majorness for themselves,
textualists should reject the doctrine as purporting to provide
courts with a supreme political veto power upsetting the exclusive

243. FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee's note to 1998 amendment (emphasis in
original) (capitalization altered).
244. The twelve geographic circuit courts of appeals each have internal operating
procedures relating to en banc procedures. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 35(a) (referring to FED.
R. APP. P. 35(a), which states that en banc review is not favored and ordinarily will not
be ordered unless “the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance”);
11TH CIR. R. 35-3 (en banc consideration is intended “to bring to the attention of the
entire court a precedent-setting error of exceptional importance”).
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lawmaking procedures outlined in Article I, Section 7.
For textualists interested in reviving the nondelegation doctrine,
then, strengthening the major questions doctrine is the wrong way
forward. Instead of burdening a revived nondelegation doctrine
with the baggage accompanying the judicially crafted major questions doctrine, textualists wishing to limit the application of the
nondelegation doctrine to “major” questions may find themselves
more comfortable exercising the grants of discretion afforded to
courts in the certiorari and en banc processes. By exercising such
discretion, en banc courts could largely limit their nondelegation
holdings to those statutes that the courts determine to present “important” (i.e., major) questions.

